Every month, in a relaxed location in central London the London Legal Salon will meet to discuss the big questions facing the law today. Attendance is always free. This blog will publish articles by attendees and the organisers to supplement the debates at our monthly meetings.







Every meeting will be introduced by a short talk from a lawyer or commentator in the area under examination. The discussion will then be opened to those attending to make contributions or ask questions. The meetings will last around ninety minutes and operate under Chatham House rules.







The discussions and the articles on this website will look to scrutinise the black letter of the law and its implications in the Courts and wider society. They will also look to situate the law in its historical and political context. We hope that by developing an understanding of where the law has come from, and why the law has taken the form it has today, we may begin to form an idea of where we want it to go.







Sunday, 10 June 2012

Should gay people be allowed to marry?

At 1930 on the 26th of June 2012 at the Old Bank Of England on Fleet Street,  the London Legal Salon will meet to discuss gay marriage. 
 
Over recent months, everyone seems to be coming out in favour of gay marriage. From George Clooney to David Cameron, Kim Kardashian to Lady Gaga, support for gay marriage has clearly become the progressive cause of the moment. But opinion remains divided. A government consultation on marriage reform launched earlier this year, which would have allowed for gay marriages in restricted circumstances, split the coalition with David Cameron eventually allowing a free vote on the issue.

Some argue that the current ban on gay marriage is fundamentally a question of equality, akin to women having the vote or rights for ethnic minorities. After all, how can it be right in a liberal society for a group of people to be prevented from taking part in an ancient social institution because of their sexuality? However, others have expressed concerns that allowing gay marriage would devalue marriage as a social institution which has traditionally been associated with procreation. The state’s tinkering with these institutions should be open to scrutiny and critique, especially as there seems to be little public appetite to allow gays to marry.

Would allowing gay marriage devalue traditional marriage? If so, is this a problem? Are those who argue against gay marriage simply homophobes and backwards conservatives? What impact should changing attitudes have on our social institutions and how should the law react?

Email lonlegalsalon@gmail.com to reserve your place.

SPEAKER: Brendan O’Neill, editor of Spiked Online.

Friday, 11 May 2012

Thank you

Thanks to all who attended the London Legal Salon discussion on Free Speech at Football.  Those interested in follow up reading may be interested in a new report from Civil Liberties group the Manifesto Club on 'Bubble Matches'.  View the report here:  http://www.manifestoclub.com/bubblematchreport

Details of our next discussion will follow shortly.

Tuesday, 3 April 2012

8th of May 2012 at 1930: Who is singing anymore? Is the law strangling free speech at football?

On the 8th of May 2012 the London Legal Salon will meet back at the Hoop and Grapes on Farringdon Street to discuss free speech at football.

Up and down the United Kingdom, the law is creeping onto the terraces.  Earlier this month Liam Stacey, a student from South Wales, was jailed for ‘tweeting’ mocking remarks about Bolton Football Club’s Farbrice Muamba whilst he suffered a heart attack during a game.   In Scotland, new criminal offences, contained in the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications Act 2012, mean that Scottish football fans could be arrested for crossing themselves or for singing the wrong song.  In England, high profile prosecutions of players for the use of racist language on the pitch has led David Cameron to pledge in the course of a government Anti Racism summit in February that he would ‘crush’ racism out of football.  His language suggests that upcoming reforms of English laws could follow the Scottish model.

Proponents of the Scottish law and supporters of reform in England argue that racist and sectarian behaviour at football matches creates a climate of acceptability of such behaviour off the pitch. But critics argue that regulation not only threatens to stifle the atmosphere at matches, but also sets a dangerous precedent for the regulation of free speech in wider society.

Should we use the law to crack down on offensive speech at football matches? Or should we let what’s said in the ground stay in the ground? What does the regulation of speech at matches suggest about our approach to free speech in wider society?
Speakers: 

Kevin Rooney,  Free Spech campaigner and teacher at Queen's School
Dan Jones, Journalist at the Evening Standard

Tuesday, 10 January 2012

Tuesday 31st January: The Stephen Lawrence Verdicts

On Tuesday 31st January at 1930 the London Legal Salon will discuss the verdicts in the Stephen Lawrence case.  The discussion will take place at the Hoop and Grapes at 80 Farringdon Street.(http://www.thehoopandgrapes.co.uk/).  We look forward to seeing you there!
 
On the 3rd of January, David Norris and Gary Dobson were convicted of the murder of Stephen Lawrence. The Crown Prosecution Service called the case the ‘most significant of a generation’.

Many celebrated the verdicts as a victory for justice over prejudice; one which went some way to purging the bungling police investigation into the murder in 1993. But others felt some unease with the way in which these defendants were treated. Dobson became one of few defendants to be retried following the quashing of his acquittal by the Court of Appeal under provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which abrogated the ancient principle that a defendant should not be tried for the same crime twice. The jury were shown footage of the defendants making racist remarks and acting out violence taken from surveillance cameras secreted in Dobson’s home, evidence which would have been inadmissible before 2003. Further, the pair had suffered such wide spread adverse publicity in the intervening years that many thought a fair trial was impossible.

Whilst few will feel any sympathy for Norris and Dobson, their conviction raises important questions about the principles that underpin our criminal justice system. Should Dobson have faced a trial for an offence he had been acquitted of? How should the criminal justice system accommodate developments in science and technology? Did the men receive a fair trial? What is the legacy of the Lawrence convictions for the criminal justice system and society as a whole?
 
SPEAKERS

Rob Lyons: Writer for Spiked Online (http://www.spiked-online.org.uk/); Author of ‘Panic on a Plate: How Society Developed an Eating Disorder’ (http://www.paniconaplate.com/).

Aneurin Brewer: Barrister at 9 Bedford Row, practising in Criminal Law.

Tuesday, 3 January 2012

A Conviction At Any Cost?

It is no exaggeration to say that the conviction of David Norris and Gary Dobson for the murder of Stephen Lawrence is symptomatic of a criminal justice system slipping towards totalitarianism.  The alarming disregard that the establishment has shown for the rights of these men should be a catalyst for a serious and principled argument for reversing the gradual erosion of defendant’s rights, which began under New Labour and has continued under the Coalition.  It is time to make a case for rebalancing the scales in favour of defendants and against the incessant bowing of freedom beneath the false god of scientific objectivity.
The mood after the conviction of Norris and Dobson was self-congratulatory and jubilant.  Paul Dacre, who published images of the defendants in 1997 under the headline that simply read ‘Murderers’ whilst he was editor of the Daily Mail, called it a ‘glorious day for British Newspapers proving that the power of journalism, courageous headlines and relentless campaigning can act as a huge force for good in society and make a major difference to countless lives’. The Crown Prosecution Service, who brought the prosecution against the men, congratulated themselves on ‘a lot of hard work’ and called it ‘the most significant case in a generation’.  The quiet and dignified relief of Stephen Lawrence’s parents was almost drowned out by the billowing back slapping of the media and the lawyering class. 
The Crown Prosecution Service may be right to describe the case as highly significant,  but not for the reasons they imagine.  What was truly significant about the reaction to the Stephen Lawrence verdict was the glossing over of the enormous sacrifices that have been made in terms of traditional freedoms in the course of the Lawrence case.  Many have pointed out that the ancient principle of double jeopardy, roughly the idea that a defendant should not be tried for the same crime twice, was abrogated in order to secure the conviction of Gary Dobson.  But this was just one of the rights usually afforded to defendants which the establishment chose to ignore in relation to these men. 
Take, most obviously, the presumption of innocence.  For many Judges and journalists, Dobson and Norris were guilty long before the jury returned its verdict.  In the course of the MacPhereson inquiry into the Metropolitan Police’s bumbling investigation of the murder, Sir William referred to the suspects variously as ‘evil’ and ‘obvious targets for early arrest’.   In a special edition of the Tonight Programme, involving interviews with the suspects in 1999, Martin Bashir cross examined the Aicourts, Norris, Dobson and Knight on their accounts of their movements on the night.  Bashir invited each of them to comment on unsubstantiated allegations and hearsay before claiming that the inconsistencies in their account made it ‘hard for anyone in the public to believe they were innocent’.  The casual disregard for this fundamental assumption of English Law was typified by the ‘courageous’ headline from the Daily Mail in 1997 – but quite what is so ‘courageous’ about publishing slanderous headlines about 3 men who cannot afford to do anything about it remains to be seen.  It is hard to remember that until Tuesday, Dobson and Norris were innocent men.  The Aicourts and Luke Knight remain so.    
Then consider the right to silence.  The defendants were continually chastised by the establishment for failing to give an account of themselves.  Lord Justice Simon Brown, in the course of a ruling which confirmed the obligation on the defendants to give evidence to the MacPhereson Inquiry on pain of prosecution said ‘these defendants twice had the opportunity to protest their innocence and have chosen not to do so’.  Quoting Brown LJ, MacPherson concluded in his report that their silence meant ‘the press and the public cannot be blamed for voicing their suspicions about them which are current and will remain alive’.   Michael Mansfield QC,  the barrister who undertook the private prosecution of the men in 1994 and who has built a career on purporting to champion defendant’s rights, said in an interview with the Guardian Newspaper : ‘The Lawrence suspects had a right not to answer questions that might incriminate them. But to refuse to answer any questions beyond their names was an abuse’.   Throughout the investigation and the inquiry the men were scorned for refusing to bow to Judicial and media pressure to assist the police and for choosing to affirm their fundamental right to remain silent. 
And what of the principle of double jeopardy?  This principle of English Law lasted from the Ancient Greeks until the New Labour government decided to disregard it in the Criminal Justice Act of 2003.  Double Jeopardy is often cited as originating in canon law but its routes are more democratic.   In the Roman republic, the decision of a single Magistrate was only appealable to a Court made up from the citizens of that republic.  Because blame was understood as fundamentally social,  it was thought that society could not be wrong in their decisions as to how they allocated blame.  Double Jeopardy was born from the fundamentally democratic idea that the decisions of the people in deciding whether someone was blameworthy simply could not be wrong. 
But a noble ancestry was not enough for the New Labour government, who in 2003 abolished double jeopardy in the course of a sweeping attack on defendant’s rights. The Act stipulated that the Court of Appeal could quash a jury’s acquittal and order the retrial of a defendant for the same crime in the face of ‘new and compelling evidence’ as to the defendant’s guilt.  It also allowed evidence of ‘bad character’ to be shown to juries.  This was why it was permitted for the jury in the Stephen Lawrence case to be played the ‘racist surveillance’ footage showing the men engaging in racist and violent behaviour in Dobson’s home.  It also placed an obligation on defendants to disclose the nature of their defence to the prosecution months in advance of their trial, including the names and details of all the witnesses that they intend to call.  This removed the long established right of the defence to ‘ambush’ the prosecution at trial. 
All of these reforms were driven by dangerously authoritarian assumption which became a hallmark of New Labour’s approach to criminal justice in response to Lawrence’s death:  that the sole purpose of the Courts is to deliver accurate verdicts efficiently.  Of course, an accurate verdict is a vital goal for any justice system.  But an accurate verdict means nothing if the state and the citizen are not placed on an equal footing in the course of its determination.  This is why the rights accorded to defendants are vital and why any attempt to curb or ignore them should cast a significant shadow over any subsequent verdict.
It goes without saying that society is better off without Norris and Dobson.  But anyone who is dedicated to protecting freedom and ensuring limits on state power should be extremely concerned after their conviction.  Their trial showcased all the authoritarian developments in our justice system since Stephen Lawrence’s tragic death.  It is now vital that we reinvigorate the debate around the rights of defendants and strenuously resist this incessant drive towards efficiency and accuracy.  No conviction is worth the cost. 


Tuesday, 22 November 2011

Can extra judicial killing ever be just?

The next meeting of the London Legal Salon will be on Monday the 12th of December 2011 at 1930. We have changed the venue this time around. We will now be hosted by the Hoop and Grapes on Farringdon Street (http://www.thehoopandgrapes.co.uk/Menu.htm). Attendance is free as always.

Moral philosopher Piers Benn will introduce a discussion on the moral and legal questions behind extra judicial killing. An introductory blurb is below. Readings can be obtained by emailing londonlegalsalon@gmail.com
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Look forward to seeing you on the 12th,

The London Legal Salon

CAN EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING EVER BE JUST?

Following the capture of the Nazi leadership after the Second World War Harry Truman, the then president of the United States, insisted that they should stand trial. He said their summary execution ‘would not sit easily on the American conscience or be remembered by our children with pride…the only course is to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused after a hearing as dispassionate as the times will permit and upon a record that will leave our reasons and motives clear”.

In contrast, following the killing of Osama Bin Laden in May, Barak Obama proclaimed to the world that ‘justice had been done’. But had it? The White House justified the killing by pointing out that the United States were at war with Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden was a military target. Others argued variously that trying Bin Laden would be either impossible or undesirable. But opinion was divided. Many, including Human Rights lawyer Geoffrey Robertson QC, claimed that Bin Laden was entitled to due process and that a trial would have allowed for his ‘de-mystification’ in the dock.

Bin Laden is just one of many suspected members of Al-Qaeda to have been killed by the United States authorities through targeted assassinations without any judicial sanction. Similar tactics have also been employed by the Israeli government in targeting suspected terrorists in Palestine. These ‘extra judicial’ killings raise important questions about the role of International Law in regulating modern conflicts and international anti-terrorism. Is it possible to try suspected international terrorists and when, if ever, should we want to? Since 1949, the Geneva Convention has sought to set the minimum standards for a state’s behaviour in the course of war. But at a time where wars are fought not just between states, but between states and amorphous and elusive organisations like Al Qaeda, have the old rules of war become out-dated?

Wednesday, 12 October 2011

What are Public Inquries For?

 
At 1930 on Monday the 24th of October 2011 Adam Burgess will introduce a discussion on Public Inquiries at the Perseverance, on Lamb's Conduit Street in Holborn (http://www.the-perseverance.moonfruit.com/)

The last 20 years have witnessed the meteoric rise of the Public Inquiry. 30 were ordered by British governments between 1990 and 2009. Whilst this sounds unremarkable, it was double the number that had been ordered throughout the rest of the 20th Century.

Their rise has been controversial. The Inquiries Act 2005 placed greater power in the hands of ministers to control the parameters of Inquiries, as well as enabling them to limit access to their findings. This raised concerns that the Act would lead to Inquiries becoming less transparent and less effective in ensuring accountability.

Others have suggested that Inquiries have become overburdened. At the beginning of the 20th Century, the motivation behind the ordering of an Inquiry was to guarantee independence where issues were raised as to the conduct of the establishment. Examples include the ad-hoc committee of Inquiry established in 1912 to investigate the Marconi Scandal, in which government ministers were accused of insider trading in an American communications company.

However, since the 1960s, Inquiries have increasingly addressed broader concerns around regulating risks to the public. This is illustrated by the enormous expansion of Inquiries into the healthcare and childcare sectors. The Bristol Inquiry of 1998 was described as the ‘widest ranging investigation into medical standards since the founding of the NHS’ and the Laming Inquiry had a significant impact on child protection policy following the murder of Victoria Climbie.

What is behind the rise of the Public Inquiry? Has there been a shift in their role in society? Do they allow the Judiciary to become too influential in political issues and is this a good thing? Are they a vital mechanism to ensure transparency or a symptom of a society obsessed with eliminating risk?

Readings can be obtained by emailing londonlegalsalon@gmail.com.